Boston’s Big Dig Project:
A Cautionary Tale
Wendy Haynes

Introduction
Little did I know as I moved from Oregon to
Massachusetts in 1988 that I would soon be witness to
one of the most complex and expensive megaprojects
in North America. Actually, I’d never heard of the term
“megaproject,” a point of ignorance I shared with most
of the planet’s population. I’ve since found that experts
in the field define a megaproject as a publicly funded infrastructure project that costs in excess of a billion dollars and requires more than a decade to plan, design, and
construct. Boston’s $15 billion Central Artery/Third
Harbor Tunnel (CA/T) Project still hits the top of the
chart for cost and complexity on the list of megaprojects undertaken in the last two decades of the twentieth
century. The CA/T Project provides a rich laboratory
for studying the inner workings of these mammoth and
costly undertakings.

tric dam project on the Yangtze River. But the Big Dig
project holds its own in the megaproject hall of fame, or
infamy, as the case may be.

Although Bostonians may think of the Big Dig as one
unified project, it is actually three separate projects
rolled into one by the vagaries and vision of public
officials seeking advantage in the politics of the federal
transportation appropriations process. The Big Dig
boasts three related but distinct design and construction projects:
•Bridging the Charles River
with an asymmetrical cable
stay structure (The Leonard P.
Zakim-Bunker Hill Memorial
Bridge);
•Reconstructing the downtown
central artery (I-93) underMy 13-year stint in the Massachusetts Office of the
ground and demolishing the old
Inspector General would expose me to many things, in- elevated artery; and
cluding the interior machinations of planning, designing •Extending the Turnpike (I-90)
and constructing Boston’s CA/T Project. In fact, then
across Fort Point Channel
Inspector General Joseph Barresi and his First Assistant, through South Boston, and
Steve Cotton, eventually tasked me with creating a
across Boston Harbor to Logan
multidisciplinary team to monitor what would become International Airport by way of
known as the “Big Dig” project. I soon learned that the
a newly constructed (1995) immersed tube tunnel.
structural and civil engineering aspects of the project
Maintaining the impetus for the Big Dig required a
paled in comparison to the political and social engineerprodigious display of political engineering that rivaled
ing that was needed to sustain momentum toward
and surpassed the remarkable civil engineering expertise
completion. Now, 20 years after my first introduction to
on display throughout the 7.5 mile stretch of roadway,
the Big Dig, I still marvel at the audacity of the project
bridge, and tunnel. According to state documents, the
champions. I hope that, by the end of this article, I’ve
massive project was designed to improve traffic flow,
succeeded in peeling back some of the layers of the Big
safety, and air quality in one of the national’s oldest and
Dig’s complexity and piquing the reader’s interest in
most congested cities. Big Dig proponents also promised
the megaproject phenomenon.
to promote economic development in the region. Some
On Megaprojects and the Big Dig
even describe the undertaking as a beautification project
Across the nation, taxpayers (and toll and rateenvisioned by transportation guru Frederick Salvucci
payers) pump billions of dollars into public works
mid-way through the twentieth century.
megaprojects. The projects range in type and location
Urban legend has it that former Secretary Salvucci was
from the Alameda Corridor (Los Angeles, California)
as a young man greatly disturbed by the treatment
to the Denver International Airport (Colorado) to
his immigrant grandmother endured at the hands of
the Woodrow Wilson Bridge (connecting Virginia,
MassPike officials as they cleared the way for an urban
Maryland, and DC). Beyond our borders, we marvel
highway earlier in the century. According to Thomas
at the $16 billion 30-mile English Channel Tunnel and
the Chinese government’s $25 billion dollar hydroelecBridgewater Review
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P. Hughes, an avid megaproject historian, Salvucci’s
grandmother was ordered to vacate her house in the
Brighton section of Boston within ten days and never
received fair compensation for her property or mental anguish. Salvucci vowed not to follow the Robert
Moses tradition of leveling neighborhoods in the name
of progress.
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The Big Dig, a project funded by federal and stated
monies (about 60/40), was substantially completed
late in 2007 for nearly $15 billion. Informed observers
question the definition of “substantially completed,”
especially in light of the Boston Globe’s recent report of
a 2,000-item list of things yet to be done on the project.
That’s a far cry from statements in the mid-1980s when
project managers estimated the cost at $2.6 billion and
looked for completion some time toward the end 1998.
Big Dig Stakeholder
The list of people and organizations with a stake in the
Big Dig would fill volumes—the business community,
neighborhood organizations (North End, Chinatown,
etc.), highways users, environmentalists, design and
construction firms, property owners along the Big Dig
corridor, and on and on. But few had a bigger stake in
the project than four high-stakes players:
•Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff (B/PB) the joint venture
hired by the Commonwealth in 1985 to manage Big Dig
design and construction;
•Federal Highway Administration (FHWA—in the U.S.
Department of Transportation), the federal funding
agency for the Big Dig and many other highway projects across the United States;
•Massachusetts General Court (the Legislature), which
would be on the hook for funding whatever FHWA
refused to pay; and
•Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MassPike), the
quasi-independent state entity that took over the Big
Dig in 1997 from MassHighway and assumed responsibility for maintaining the project into the future.
The chart below—taken from the most recent material available from MassPike (May 2007)—shows what

funding sources pay how much of the Big Dig costs. In
June 2000, under pressure from Congress, the FHWA
dug in its heels and froze the amount it would pay
toward the Big Dig at $8.549 billion. Today, that covers
just under 60 percent of the 2007 project cost estimate
of $14.798 billion. Various state revenue sources will
pay about 40 percent of the total cost of the project—
far more than the 10–20 percent projected by project
enthusiasts in the 1980s and 1990s.
Key Events in the Rich and Turbulent
History of the Big Dig
1970s and early 1980s. Massachusetts officials seek
local support, federal funding, and environmental approvals for the Big Dig
1985–1995. Commonwealth hires B/PB to manage the
Big Dig and moves ahead on the megaproject
In the early 1980s, Transportation Secretary Fred
Salvucci assigned responsibility for the Big Dig to the
Massachusetts Department of Public Works (MDPW—
later to be named the Massachusetts Highway
Department), the department that was also responsible
for overseeing the design and construction of road and
bridge projects throughout the state. There appears to
have been general, though not unanimous, agreement
that if the project were to be undertaken, there was no
alternative but to rely heavily on consultants to manage
the megaproject under the Commonwealth’s direction.
Transportation officials and some political leaders were
concerned that scarce in-house resources would be diverted to the Big Dig from road and bridgework outside
the Boston metropolitan area. Their concerns, shared by
federal highway officials, buttressed the decision to rely
heavily on hired expertise from the private sector.
In 1985, MDPW hired the joint venture of Bechtel/
Parsons Brinckerhoff Quade and Douglas (B/PB) to
manage design and construction of what was then
known as the Central Artery/Third Harbor Tunnel
Project. Between 1985 and 2006, the Commonwealth
would pay B/PB more than $2 billion through a series of
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open-ended consulting contracts to manage the project
from stem to stern.
1996–1997: Legislature Creates
Metropolitan Highway System (MHS); Big
Dig Management
Switches from
MassHighway to
MassPike
Public officials faced a
major financial bind in
the mid-nineties. By
1996, about $4.7 billion
had been obligated
for the Big Dig—$4.1
billion in federal funds
(86 percent) and about $650 million in state funds.
FHWA demanded proof that the Commonwealth
would have the wherewithal to handle its part of the
deal. The primary source for transportation funding in
Massachusetts is state transportation bonds, supported
by fuel taxes and other sources. Typically, the State has
borrowed funds by issuing general and special obligation bonds. Proceeds from these bond issuances, which
are authorized by the Legislature through transportation bond bills, cover the State share of federal-aid
projects, and pay for non-federally funded projects.
In his cover letter to the Legislature, Governor William
Weld noted that the MHS bill “answers the challenge
set forth by the FHWA to implement a strategy for
payment of the Commonwealth’s share of future CA/T
[Big Dig] Project costs by April 1, 1997.” The bill moved
quickly through the Legislature and the Governor
signed it on March 20, 1997. A companion transportation bond bill, passed by the Legislature and signed into
law by the Governor in May 1997, ensured that funds
would be available to cover the Big Dig cost, then estimated at $10.8 billion.
MassPike and MassHighway wasted no time entering
into a management agreement, effective July 1, 1997,
whereby MassPike would manage completion of the Big
Dig, provided that MassHighway would continue to be
the recipient state agency for federal funds and “remain
fully liable for paying all costs of the CA/T Project not
otherwise paid from the $700 million to be paid” by
MassPike. Shortly thereafter, Governor Weld resigned
and Paul Cellucci, his Lieutenant Governor, stepped into
the Governor’s office, assuring the public that the Big
Dig would come in on time and under budget under the
continuing direction of James J. Kerasiotes.

Estimates, Lies, and Cost Overruns
Stunning increases in megaproject schedule and cost
estimates have caused political observer David Luberoff
and others to pose a troubling question: is our political
system so flawed that those who build infrastructure
cannot tell the truth about costs? While I
hesitate to pin the problem on our political
system, there’s ample evidence that megaprojects routinely exceed time and budget
estimates trotted out by proponents when
they’re pursuing public and legislative support. The Big Dig is no exception. Indeed,
cynics could learn much from the Big Dig
play book about creative accounting and
financial manipulations.
2000–2001: Deconstructing the True Cost
of the Big Dig
In March 2001, State Inspector General (IG) Robert
Cerasoli issued a report to the Treasurer of the
Commonwealth alleging that Big Dig officials had beginning many years earlier deliberately misrepresented
huge increases in Big Dig costs. Here’s an excerpt from
the executive summary of the IG’s report. “B/PB” refers
to Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff, the joint venture hired
in 1985 to manage Project design and construction.
Anxious to avoid the sticker shock effect of B/PB’s
total cost estimate, Big Dig officials undertook a ninemonth initiative between June 1994 and March 1995 to
decrease B/PB’s total cost estimate from $13.8 billion to
$8 billion. At this time, the Secretary of Transportation
and Construction publicly announced that the ontime and on-budget figure would not exceed $8 billion.
Documents cite a directive from Big Dig officials telling
B/PB to “hit the target” of $7.98 billion. To hit the
target, state, B/PB, and local FHWA officials began an
extensive cost reduction initiative that consisted of the
following:
•Reducing every B/PB “to-go” contract estimate across
the board—including material, labor and overhead—by
a 13 percent “market discount” despite the recommendation of B/PB officials by letter from the home office in
San Francisco not to do so….
•Reducing every to-go contract estimate by eliminating
the 18 percent contingency allowance for construction
growth during design.
•Excluding all management costs from the estimate
after the year 2002 [note that the management team did
not close up operations until 2007!]….
•Excluding more than $1 billion in costs defined as
“non-project” costs.
•Stating all estimates in 1994 dollars and excluded to
go escalation (inflation costs) from the total cost. Later,
they insisted that the budget exclude all escalation
since 1988….
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policy makers off the rocks before big problems sail in.
Put pressure on management to use such techniques as
constructibility reviews and value engineering analyses
during the design phase, rather than dealing through
change orders with problems that could have been
eliminated before construction (or product delivery).
Early work increases the likelihood that management
(and the IG) will be able to identify opportunities
for cutting costs and ensuring a high quality facility,
whether that facility be a multibillion-dollar highway or
an interagency radio installation.
•Go for major vulnerable “pulse” points. Do what
Primarily as a result of their failed oversight on the Big
internal auditors might do. Take a look at the manDig, FHWA issued a series of directives and cautions for
agement controls that are (or should be) in place. For
megaproject oversight across the nation, demanding
instance, if funding sources require pre/post award
more detailed financial reports and ordering regional
audits on contracts (the feds usually do for professional
FHWA offices to keep a much closer eye on large transservice/consulting contracts), make sure the agency
portation projects in their districts.
has that function in place. Develop a good relationship with the agency’s internal auditors and outside
Concerns Loom…again
funding agencies. They’ll tip you off to problems and
Much of the Big Dig saga might have faded into the
past except for the tragic death of a woman in July 2006 opportunities. Also: watch out for proprietary specifications and sole-source contracts. These approaches,
when a falling ceiling tile in a connector tunnel killed
if selected, should be fully justified in writing on the
Milena Delvalle who was driving with her spouse to
Logan Airport in the early morning hours. The incident basis of agency needs, NOT the ability of one vendor or
manufacturer to tilt the specs to their own advantage.
revived earlier concerns about accountability and overAND: assess the overall “control environment.” Do the
sight on the Big Dig, especially with respect to
top leaders hold themselves and the organization to the
B/PB’s role in facility failures and cost overruns.
highest ethical standards. Are those standards clearly
Recently, B/PB agreed to return about $400 million
understood and discussed?
to the Commonwealth in a settlement agreement
•Follow the money. If most of the work will be
approved by U.S. Attorney Michael Sullivan and State
contracted out, look at specifications, procurement
Attorney General Martha Coakley. The Boston Globe
procedures and pre-bid prequalification requirements
reported that by settling in this matter, B/PB avoided
immediately. The last thing you need is for favored
criminal charges in the tunnel collapse and would thus
not be disbarred from receiving future federal and state vendors of powerful politicos to get the work without
fairly competing for it. And that could happen unless
government contracts.
procurement regulations ensure a level playing field for
Megaproject Oversight Pointers
all firms who are qualified to bid on a job (or to submit
So what can we learn from these experiences? As
a written proposal in response to a request for proposals
a result of my work in the Inspector General’s (IG)
to provide professional services). If anyone or any firm
office and subsequent research—and the great advice
now under contract wasn’t competitively procured, you
of colleagues—I developed the following pointers for
already have a problem.
megaproject oversight leaders:
•Empower the managing agency. You are the
•Budget oversight costs right along with the project.
monitoring agency, not the manager. Make sure that the
Funding for oversight efforts should be allocated as
agency managers charged with making all this happen
part of the basic project costs, just as one might budget
know they are the “owner” and need strong “owner”
for design costs, project office space, and staff. (The
representation—that is, tough staff or owner represenIG appealed to the Legislature for 1⁄10th of 1% of the
tative under contract, and clear, demanding contract
estimated project costs in the early-mid 1990s, but even
language throughout.
that modest amount didn’t fly.)
•Define performance standards in agency mission
•Start early. The earlier you weigh in on management
and contract provisions. You’ll have a tough time
systems, procurement procedures, and design issues,
holding agencies accountable for holding their staff
the more likely you are to be able to warn managers and
and contractors accountable (a BIG part of your job,
presumably) if the standards for project delivery aren’t
spelled out and measurable.
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More heads rolled; Governor Cellucci had already
ousted James J. Kerasiotes, who was regarded by many
as the primary instigator of this high-stakes shell game.
Kerasiotes had arguably been responsible for the Big
Dig for many years in various capacities, most recently
as head of MassPike. Although little came of it, the
Securities and Exchange Commission launched an
investigation into whether Commonwealth officials
deliberately misled bond-buyers when they failed to
identify the magnitude of Big Dig liability in their
bond prospectus.

•Push the agency to have reliable, timely reporting systems. This will be your saving grace. If
you can induce the managing agency to have a good
reporting system for contract performance, payments,
and change orders, you can monitor THEIR reports,
periodically test for validity, and then go to the field to
find out whether they’re reporting what’s really happening. There’s nothing like a big change order early in
construction to signal problems down the road. Be sure
to get on the distribution lists for all their routine status
reports and minutes of public meetings. No doubt they
will be sanitized, but you can still look for big dollar
change orders, delays, and disputes. And, finally: scrutinize the assumptions underlying project cost estimates.
The bottom line figures provided by the agency may
include offsets and assumptions about future savings or
aggressive cost control measures that artificially deflate
the total project cost. Beware of creative accounting!
•Have a steady on-site presence. Spend as much
staff time as possible on-site and in the field. Show up at
meetings, sit in on pre-bid conferences, talk with staff—
BE THERE. Some of our best leads come from hallway
conversations with in-house agency staff, vendors,
aggrieved bidders, and disgruntled employees.
Conclusions
In the 1980s and 1990s, public officials were all too
willing to cede responsibility for managing public
projects to private ventures. Particularly as we moved
into the 1990s—with the cry for government reform,
“steering not rowing,” outsourcing, and privatization—
state agencies were not then and probably never were
equipped to deal with a project like the Big Dig without significant reliance on private sector expertise.
Massachusetts officials operated under the delusion that
if they fostered a collaborative and harmonious relationship with B/PB, all would be well. Surely, B/PB would
not risk its international reputation with substandard
performance on Boston’s megaproject.
One need only walk along the greenway that’s growing where once the elevated Central Artery cast its
shadow to appreciate the Big Dig’s contribution to the
beauty of downtown Boston. The Zakim Bridge lights
up the night and the Ted Williams Tunnel eases our
way to Logan Airport. But at what cost do we enjoy
these marvels? For many years to come, the Big Dig’s
$15 billion price tag will siphon state and federal funds
from roadways and bridges sadly in need of repair and
replacement.

The Big
Dig is,
indeed, a
cautionary tale.
I hope it
serves as a
reminder
to all of us
that when
we cede responsibility to private entities without ensuring adequate oversight, we also mortgage our grandchildren’s future. Our public officials—elected and appointed—have a stewardship responsibility to safeguard
public resources. In the case of the Big Dig, some of our
stewards fell far short of the mark. In BSC’s Master of
Public Administration program, I have the opportunity to work with my colleagues in the Department of
Political Science to help ensure that we do not repeat
the mistakes of the past as we move forward.

February2004:
An aerial view
of the old
elevated
Central Artery
(I-93) without
its road deck
just north of
Rowes Wharf.

I want to share the concluding words from my dissertation. It seems a fitting end to this article:
We ask an extraordinary amount of our public leaders
and managers. The visions of others, inherited through
administrative changes and the vicissitudes of public
life, may place dedicated public servants in the position of overseeing undertakings for which they have
neither sufficient organizational strength nor long-term
institutional support. And yet they persevere. As we
scrutinize, analyze, dissect, compare and contrast their
efforts, we should acknowledge the debt of gratitude we
owe to those dedicated professionals who work for us
every day. They receive too little appreciation for their
deeds. We owe them—and the public they serve—our
respect and the best thoughtful attention academia has
to offer.
Dr. Haynes notes that her fascination with the Big Dig extended beyond the walls of the Office of the Inspector General to her
work on a doctoral dissertation on the Central Artery/Tunnel
Project and the Boston Harbor Clean up at Northeastern
University in the Law, Policy and Society Program.
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